Ambassador. We didnt think it would happen so quickly. So all of that being said is I dont think we have to worry about China being involved in any way in Ukraine. But its Richard Nixon, as he makes a bid for the Oval Office again, who recognizes that you have to do something about the international system. And I believe part of the story is that he was afraid of leaks. Ive worked with several presidents; Ive never seen any president work as hard for a summit. And the big issue here before we agreed on the secret visit was to make sure the agenda was much broader than Taiwan, which China wanted. We made a breakthrough with the Vietnam negotiations with the help of China, with Zhou Enlai going to HanoiI dont want to exaggerate itin October. In August 1955, a 14-year-oldBlack boy named Emmett Till was murdered by two white men. All the outer space treaties and things of that sort are not sufficient to constrain. So let me get to the presidents trip in the time we have remaining. For their part, the Chinese media devoted unprecedented attention to the Nixon visit. OPERATOR: Our next question from Margaret Karns. fbq('init', '271837786641409'); And that position changed. And I looked out the window and I said to my wife: I think I see a Peking Tom. I dont believe this, but in the recent discussions Ive been a part of on the anniversary the argument has been made to me that it was a bad idea because the Chinese, essentially, got the better part of the deal from Nixons opening, that Taiwan lost out, the democraticdemocratization issue didnt come until twenty years later, and Beijing received all the benefits of greater international stature and recognition and engagement that led to its economic success. The explanation I get is that our engineers cost more. Making an exception for China, a country that the United States had fought in Korea, making an exception for Mao Zedong, the same leader that the United States had fought in Korea, was a huge political gamble. Thank you. Yes. Theres deterrence from us. And then there was a debate in my follow-up response to it. Do you think theres an opportunity for China and the United States to collaborate more closely in space, or even go as far as to aim for Mars exploration together? OPERATOR: Next question from Robyn Meredith. Like, if we reassure Taiwan were deterring China or, you know, in this case, if we, you know, are deterring the Soviet Union we have to, you know, reassure China. Those were our goals. Was it even considered? We immediately improved relations with the Soviets on the main negotiation, arms control. Anyway, thats another story. And he wrote to Ray Price, and he said: We cannot permanently isolate one billion of potentially the most capable people in the world. by Lindsay Maizland We had another public trip in October 71 where we went back with the White House staff to set up, on the one hand, the logistic, security, itinerary, media arrangements for the trip but also to go over the agenda for the president and to begin a communique. I had to get permission from the State Department because she was a Chinese citizen. Any initial press and Congressional criticism of the Shanghai Communiques "sellout" of Taiwan was soon lost in the afterglow of the historic event. Because the U.S. government took responsibility for this building. And one of the big things that I have been advocating for is if the Biden administration wants to lead with diplomacy, which I think is great, there are many areas where we could be building better institutions to help shape.
In those days, Beijing was known as Peking. Both sides had to gain. Were fifty years later, thanks essentially to its own efforts, but bipartisan support for Taiwanthey have autonomy, they have the economy, they have the democracy that I mentioned, so by definition, Taiwan was not sold out. But Yugoslavia is not a major strategic country. Were getting more and more difficult maintaining our relationship with Roscosmos. What are we talking about on Taiwan? But that was a very risky strategy. MASTRO: Well, I will tell you fromyou know, and maybe some of our other panelists can talk more on the historical perspectivebut your question, really, points to this fundamental tension in U.S. strategy between, you know, reassuring allies and partners and sometimes deterring adversaries. So I guess what Im trying to say is theres always people and always countries that are going to beand thenor entities that are going to be unhappy with the decisions that the United States makes for the sake of, you know, aggregate benefit in the international system. And if we could somehow break the bonds between Beijing and Moscow today, we might see certain benefits as we attempt to contain Russian imperialism in Europe. Why is he left out of the historic diplomacy? While they regretted it, they understood that it was driven by a larger necessity for American foreign policy. And wouldwhile Xi Jinping may not be really measuring sanctions, much like Putin, do you think that sanctions could dissuade or really provide a huge economic disincentive for him? President Biden is the latest U.S. leader to grapple with how to balance democracy promotion with the desire for a better bilateral relationship. 'https://connect.facebook.net/en_US/fbevents.js'); OPERATOR: Our next question from James Mann. We know it was big in 72, and Nixon goes on to win a landslide election in November. The Cultural Revolution hadwas stagnant and a dead end for him at that point. Oriana? The question of whether there is evidence that the clashes between the Soviet-Chinese militaries along the Ussuri River in 1969 were a factor for either Nixon or Mao in their openness to change in the early 70s. (Laughs.) Tim, how big a deal is itwas it when Nixon went to China in 72? He respected him as a world leader, as a person who wielded power. And perhaps Ive gotten that wrong, but I believe that it wasnt until the group arrived in Beijing that they were certain of meeting Mao. fbq('track', 'ViewContent'); And by choosing to work with or open relations with China, huge power on Soviet borders and a rival of the Soviet Union in the international communist world, would in a sensewould in a sense soften the effects of the strategic retreat from Southeast Asia, and potentially ease the achievement of a retreat with honor, that Richard Nixon was seeking. And so at least, you know, the United States won the Cold War. BRINKLEY: Thank you for all youve done over the years with NASA. I think we stand a much better chance of working with the Chinese. So its complicated on the Chinese side. Oriana, students are so lucky to have you at Stanford. Great that you called in. Sri Lankas new president should be able to finish negotiations with the IMF, but protesters will likely demand more. And we know why in foreign policy its so important. Im a professor of history at Rice University. We hadnt realized that the television images beamed back to American audiences at their dinner and breakfast tables showing panda bears, toasting leaders, the army band of the PLA playing American songsthat had tremendous impact, together with the geopolitical advantages, so it turned out to be a very popular initiative. They were better off with their treaty with the United States. We finished tough negotiations on Taiwan and finished the communique, but when we got to Hangzhou toward the end of the trip, the State Department saw the communique for the first timedisgraceful cutting them out, but thiswhere we were, and of course, they had many suggestions.
OPERATOR: Our next question from Charlie Bolden. BRINKLEY: Tim, do you feel like jumping in here on that? And the October 72 breakthrough came within months of the Chinese and Soviet summits. We negotiated the rest of it exceptand a big exception, of coursethe Taiwan issue, as we left in October.
We signed a peace agreement January 73. I was in charge of the briefing books. Theres been a number of changes in the past three years in Chinese rhetoric, military capabilities that point to the now-possibility that China could take Taiwan at acceptable cost, and even if the United States intervenes. Oriana, do you want to. But he ruminated upon it. We had the Vietnam War demonstrations, race riots, assassinations, uneasy relationship with a nuclear superpower, no relationship with one-fifth of humanity, bogged down in our diplomacy because of Vietnam, and a fatigued and upset American domestic public. One called the Taiwan Temptation about why I think Chinas seriously considering using force to retake Taiwan. Whatever you think of our current relationship with China, I want to underscore the revolutionary quality and the beneficial effects of breaking up the nature of the international system in 1972 and bringing China in as an ally in the competition with the Soviet Union. Russiastheres obviously no love lost between Russia and China normally, historically.
But my question for Win is, what about the discussions of Vietnam during that historic summit? The era of the global internet is over, and the early advantages the United States and its allies held in cyberspace have largely disappeared. This took quite a great leap on both sides to overcome twenty-two years. Its been a great discussion so far. Follow the gripping story of the race against time to save San Francisco and the nation from an outbreak of bubonic plague in 1900. LORD: I know you want to get to a lot of questions, but Ive already indicated immediately with respect to gained from this, of course the Chinese gained. LORD: Yeah. We just have to be very straightforward and honest about the dilemmas of power, and thats one of them. Did you ever have moments where he reflected on how his meeting of Mao and Zhou Enlai, what that meant for his legacy? And thank you, everybody at the Council. To say we didnt gain with the Soviet Union, withinwhen we were flying toward China on our secret trip, Al Haig, at Kissingers instructions, called in the Chinese charg and offered them a summit. And the relationship between China and Vietnam was notwas one that was very antagonistic, and how did that conversation go? This was a pragmatic approach. He thought they were all Democrats, all liberals, and pro-Kennedy. But ever since then, with ambiguous formulations and thanks above all to the efforts of the Taiwan people and enlightened leaders, despite the shockand it was a shock fifty years ago, of course, to Taiwanthey have maintained their autonomy, with our help, their security. (Laughter.) At that point we were in this unipolar moment. So Mr. Zwock (ph), a GS-15 of the State Department, interviewed her. Haldeman instructed Kissinger "on how to make sure Nixon would get the most flattering television shots. So nine years later, I ended up being the first person into China, ahead of Kissinger, of course, because as we went secretlyyou mentioned July 71on that first trip in a Pakistani plane, I was in the front of the plane and Henry was in the back. We exchanged notes with Zhou Enlai through the Pakistani ambassador in Washington. We had six of them that were about a foot high. But there was also a domestic component to his decision to work with Zhou Enlai to make it possible for Nixon to visit. And Ambassador Lord could actually talk about, you know, what Nixon looked like as he was actually greeting Mao. If that isnt immediate benefits, I dont know what is, in addition to the other ones I mentioned. NAFTALI: Well, one of the reasons that Iand thank you for the question. One of Shinzo Abes most significant moves was adjusting Japans relationship with Taiwan. It does not go the other way, to China supporting Russia in Europe. Q: OK. And the United States had made an exception to containment with Yugoslavia. Get the latest on new films and digital content, learn about events in your area, and get your weekly fix of American history. LORD: The son-in-law of President Nixon talkingVietnam was a major issue of discussion, and our approach, not only at the summit but in subsequent visits, was to essentially say to the Chinese, you want us to balance the Soviet Union as a world power; if the Vietnamese humiliate us in negotiations on the way out, thats going to undercut that. And why did he say that? Engagedhe had Rogers engaged in something called a Rogers Plan for the Middle East. So I squared that circle as I was packing my bag the night before the public trip. So I told Henry: You havent even negotiated with Zhou Enlai, yet youve already lost your shirt. By the way, China was not the only policy he didnt bring Secretary of State Rogers into. And our foreignour foreign policy leaders, our ambassadors are constantly engaged in these balancing acts. Did we have to make a move with an ambiguous one China formulation? On April 10, nine players, four officials, and two spouses stepped across a bridge from Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland, ushering in an era of "Ping-Pong diplomacy.". With regard to the Chinese, what I know Ive learned from Chen Zhen (ph) and other wonderful scholars who arewho argue that Mao had a domestic reason. But there was an understanding and, you know, obviously, from the outside as I didnt participate in any way in this visit, but it seemed to me that there was an understanding of the urgency of the Soviet threat. July 20, 2022, Cooling the Planet Through Solar Reflection, Webinar Kissinger,White House Years, p. 1092. A dozen times on the way to Peking, Nixon told Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers that they were to stay on the plane until he had descended the gangway and shaken Chou En-lais hand. They agreed to a summit. His death helped mobilize thecivilrightsmovement. Nixonand Id just add one more pointwhich is that when we think about the value of a policy, I think we should dowe should think about it in terms of the context of when it was made. In this context, both Nixon and Kissinger came into office wanting to open up relations with China. Thank you so much, Ed, for taking the time today to join us. And they require balancing acts. (Laughter.) Because in 1963 John F. Kennedy was worried about Vietnam and told his associates, his team, that he couldnt imagine moving out of Vietnam, leaving Vietnam, until after the 64 election. 
